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THE LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL STATUS OF THE
METROPOLITAN SPECIAL DISTRICT*
ROBERT W. TOBIN"
INTRODUCTION
The metropolitan special district*** is a relatively modern imlovation
in the area of local government and dates from the creation of the London
Metropolitan Police District in 1850. Perhaps the earliest American counter-
part of the London experiment was the Metropolitan Police District of
New York (1857-1870),' although it is said that the Philadelphia area
had a metropolitan health district as early as 1806.2 As the population of
America became increasingly urban under the impetus of the industrial
revolution, thc use of the metropolitan special district became more
common. The influx of people into city areas resulted in the creation of
sprawling metropolitan communities revolving around one or more central
cities and including numerous local governments. Central cities and urban
counties were either unable or unwilling to serve the needs of the
whole metropolis, and thus the metropolitan special district entered the
void to provide area-wide integration of certain key services.
Of course, the metropolitan special district was not the only method
used for solving the governmental problems of spread-out urban areas.
City-county consolidation or separation, annexation by the central city,
strengthening of the urban county, intergovernmental contracts and numer-
ous other devices were employed.3 However, as compared to other alter-
natives, the metropolitan special district had certain advantages, the most
important of which was its ability to transcend political boundary lines
*This is the first part of a thesis being submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Iaw, in the Faculty of Law,
Columbia University.
**B.S.S., 1948; L.L.B., 1953; L.L.M., 1958.
***For the purposes of this paper the term "special district" will not include school
districts. This is in confonnity with the practice of the United States Census Bureau,
1. JONES, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, 47 (1942). See also People ex. rel.
Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532 (1857), challenging the creation of the district.
2. Jones, supra note 1, at 44.
3. Jones, The Organization of a Metropolitan Region, 105 U. P.. L, REv. 538
(1957),
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and to provide a new but limited form of local government geographically
adapted to a metropolis.
The rather unique attributes of the metropolitan special district have
not gone umioticcd and a considerable amount of scholarly attention has
been devoted to it.4 Unfortunately, very little has been written on the
legal and constitutional nature of the metropolitan district with the result
that its juridical and governmental status remain something of an enigma.
It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to determine the legal status of
the metropolitan special district by analyzing it in four respects: first, its
status under state constitutional law; second, its juridical status in non-
constitutional litigation third, the factors which legally differentiate it from
other special districts; and last, its governmental nature.
TrE STATUS OF THE ETIROPOLITAN SPECIAL Dsrrc'r UNDER
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In numerous instances the courts have been called upon to clarify
the status of a metropolitan special district in relation to state constitutional
provisions dealing with local government. This clarification has invariably
entailed an analysis of the metropolitan special district and an attempt
to classify it. Almost without exception the courts have found that metro-
politan special districts arc legislatively designated as bodies corporate and
politic,5 as are most entities invested with independent governmental nature,
but beyond this common feature the courts have discovered a multitude
of differences. Consequently the judicial decisions in this legal area have
varied a great deal from state to state and even, on occasion, within states.
Generally, howevcr, the judicial decisions have revolved around the
existence or non-existence of municipal corporate attributes in metropolitan
special districts. Since metropolitan special districts seldom have an explicit
constitutional status, it has been common for courts to appraise them by
the constitutional standards applied to municipal corporations. In the great
majority of these cases the courts have seen a substantial similarity between
metropolitan special districts and municipal corporations and have likened
them to one another for purposes of constitutional construction.6 However,
in some cases the courts have qualified their holdings by asserting that
4. For a detailed listing of works pertaining to metropolitan special districts, see
appropriate headings in Metropolitan Communities, a bibliography prepared by the
Government Affairs Foundation Inc., Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1956.
5. There are exceptions, such as the Massachusetts Metropolitan District Con-
mission and tire Port of New Orleans, which are highly state-controlled. Moreover,
there arc other instances in which a metropolitan special district is expressly incorporated,
but its political nature must be implied from its powers. For example, see the statutory
provisions creating the Port of Portland (Ore.) Port District. Oar. Rrv. STrT. § 778.010
(1957).
6. Koesis v. Chicago Park Dist., 362 IMI. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935); Wilson v.
Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 133 111. 443, 27 N.E. 203 (1891):
Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Dist., 309 Ky. 442, 217 SAV.2d 232
(1949); Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash, 294, 127 Pac. 380 (1912).
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metropolitan special districts are not pure municipal corporations, even
though they may be so classified in a test of constitutional status. 7
In a significant minority of cases, the courts have rejected contentions
that metropolitan special districts arc analogous to municipal corporations
for purposes of constitutional construction.' The courts in these cases have
held metropolitan special districts to be quasi-corporations and have likened
them to state agencies vested with some of the powers and attributes of
a municipality. The rationale of the minority view has been that the
function and autonomy of the metropolitan special district are too limited
to classify it with municipal corporations, but it would seem that this
line of reasoning has occasionally been a pragmatic rationalization to cir-
cunivent serious constitutional restrictions on municipal corporations.9
The main constitutional issues raised against metropolitan special
districts have involved nmunicipal debt limitations,' 0 improper delegation of
tax power," the improper use of special legislation,12 and the constitutional
authority of a legislature to create novel forms of local government which
overlap existing municipalities.i 3 These issues have sometimes been raised
by hostile local governments, taxpayers within the district, or by state
attorneys general in quo warranto proceedings.' 4 In the majority of these
suits the municipal corporate status of the metropolitan special district
was in dispute, although a few cases were based on the theory that the
metropolitan special district was organized in contravention of constitutional
provisions pertaining to counties.15
7. State v. Port of Astoria, 79 Ore. 1, 154 Pac. 399 (1916); Cook v. Port of
Portland, 200 Ore. 580, 27 Pac. 263 (1891).
8. Huron-Clinton Metro, Authority v. Boards of Supervisors, 300 Mich. 1, 1
N.W.2d 430 (1942); City of Lehi v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P,2d 530 (1935);
Thielen v. Metropolitan Sewerage Comm'r., 178 Wis. 34, 189 N.V. 484 (1922).
9. In City of Lehi v. Meiling, supra note 8, the majority rationale avoided a
debt limitation problem, and in lluron-Clinton Metro. Authority v. Boards of Supervisors,
sura note 8, the theory of the opinion was patently designed to avoid a very strong
argument that the creating statute was unconstitutional special legislation.
10. Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 127 Pac. 580 (1912); Koesis v.
Chicago Park Dist., 362 11. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935); State v, Metropolitan St, Louis
Sewer Dist., 365 Mo. 1, 275 S.W.2d 225 (1955); City of Indianapolis v. Buckner,
233 Ind. 32, 116 N.E2d 507 (1954).
11. Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Coninin., 71 N.J.L. 574, 60 Atl. 214
(1905); State v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 120 Ohio St. 464, 166 N.E. 407 (1929)
atfd. 281 U.S. 74 (1930); City of Lehi v. Mciling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935)
12. Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 133 II. 443, 27 N.E.
203 (1891); Huron-Clinton Metro. Authority v. Boards of Supervisors, 300 Mich. 1,
1 N.V.2d 430 (1942); Cook v. Port of Portland, 200 Ore. 580, 27 Pac. 263 (1891).
13. Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist, of Chicago, supra note 12; City
of New York v. Willeox, 115 Misc. 351, 189 N.Y.S. 724 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
14. Kocsis v. Chicago Park Dist., 362 Ill. 24, 198 N.E, 847 (1935), is a typical
taxpayers suit; State v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 365 Mo. 1, 275 S.W.2d
225 (1955), was a quo warranto proceeding in the name of the Missouri Attorney
General; City of New York v. Willeox, supra note 13, illustrates local chauvinism in
opposition to the Port of New York Authority.
15. Dahler v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Coimm'n., 133 Md. 644, 106 Atl.
10 (1919); Inter-City Fire Protection Dist. of Jackson County v. Gambrell, 360 Mo.
924, 231 S.V.2d 193 (1950).
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Except iii rare instances, such as the aforementioned cases invoking a
"county" theory, constitutional challenges to metropolitan special districts
have followed one of two pattcrns. Under one line of reasoning the plain-
tiffs have questioned the exercise of certain powers on the ground that
the metropolitan special district was not a unit of local government to
which such power could be delegated. This theory almost necessarily ran
counter to any concept of the metropolitan special district as a municipal
corporation. The complete converse of this position has been relied upon
in some constitutional suits in which the plaintiffs advanced the theory
that metropolitan special districts were municipal corporations and could
not, therefore, exceed municipal debt limitations or be created by special
acts.
One of the constitutional issues most frequently raised against tax-
supported metropolitan special districts is that their creation violates
constitutional debt limitations on municipalities. Proponents of this propo-
sition have argued that metropolitan special districts are empowered to
incur indebtedness to provide a governmental service even though the cities
within their orbit could not provide the same service without exceeding
debt limitations. Thus, it has been averred, the metropolitan special district
circumvents constitutional provisions intended for the protection of tax-
payers within municipalities.
This line of attack strikes hard at metropolitan special districts because
they overlay numerous local governments, each of which may have sub-
stantial indebtedness. If the indebtedness of a metropolitan special district
were computed cumulatively within the metropolitan area, its power to
provide adequate services would be impaired, if not destroyed. The courts,
however, have not subscribed to this theory of cumulative geographic
computation of indebtedness, and the debts of metropolitan special districts
have been computed separately from those of local governments in the
same area.'6 In instances where metropolitan special districts have absorbed
lesser districts with excessive indebtedness, the courts have also taken a
rather liberal view of the power to borrow further 11 Moreover, legislatures
have also shown awareness of the problem of cumulative indebtedness and
in creating the Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District, the Minnesota legis-
lature expressly excluded the debts of the district from those of its con-
stituent municipalities s
16. City of Indianapolis v. Buckner. 233 Ind. 32, 116 N.E.2d 225 (1955); Paine
v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 127 Pac. 580 (1912). Also see: Aniots., 94I A.L.R.
818 (1935), 171 A.L.R. 729 (1947). For a general treatment of municipal debt
limitations see Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitu-
tutional Debt Limitations, 37 COLUMI. L. REV. 177 (1937).
17. Kocsis v. Chicago Park Dist., 362 111. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935). 'he Chicago
Park District absorbed 22 smaller park districts, a ininber of which had exceeded debt
limitations. The court permitted the Chicago Park District to incur debt on the basis
of the assessed value of the taxable property within the district as a whole.
18. NIINN'. STAT. ANN. § 445.17 (10) (1945).
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This does not mean that the courts and legislatures have been
insensitive to the need for restricting the indebtedness of metropolitan
special districts. 'he statutes by which or under which they are created
often contain provisions limiting the power to tax and to incur debt.19
Furthermore, the courts have usually found that metropolitan special
districts were subject to constitutional debt limitations on local govern-
ment.20 One significant exception to this view is the case of City of Lehi
v. Meiling21 in which the Salt Lake City Metropolitan Water District was
held to be a quasi-corporation not within the purview of the municipal
debt limitation provisions of the state constitution.
Another constitutional issue which is often raised in connection with
metropolitan special districts involves the delegation of tax power to district
directors or commissioners. Such objections have been aimed primarily at
non-elective officials and have been explicitly or implicitly founded on the
time-honored principle that there shall be "no taxation without repre-
sentation." The general approach of these suits has been to assert that the
legislative tax power can't be granted to private groups or to noval units
of local government which aren't answerable to the people. In California
similar arguments have been made on the theory that delegation of tax
power to non-elective officials violated a constitutional provision prohibiting
state taxation for local purposes except through the medium of "corporate
authorities. 2 2 By and large, this theory of suit has had little success as
applied to metropolitan special districts and has been rejected in suits
involving the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, 23 the
Akron Metropolitan Park District,24 the Chicago Sanitary District,25 the
Salt Lake City Metropolitan Water District,26 and the Golden Gate Bridge
and Highway District.2"
A notable exception to this general rule was the decision in Van
Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners8 in which the taxing
19. For example see debt limitations under California's Municipal Utility District
Act, PUB. UTI.. ConE, § 12842; under Ohio's Park Districts Act, REV. CoDE O" OHIo,§ 1545.21; and under the special Minnesota legislation creating the Minneapolis- St. Paul
Sanitary District, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 445.17 (9) (1945).
20. Kocais v. Chicago Park Dist., 362 11. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935); State v.
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 365 Mo. 1, 275 S.W.2d 225 (1955); Paine v.
Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 127 Pac. 580 (1912).
21. 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 30 (1935).
22. See cases cited notes 23 & 27 infra. For a somewhat related case see Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist., 92 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1937).
23. Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. Cal. v. Burney, 215 Cal. 582, 11 P.2d 1095
(1932).
24. State v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 120 Ohio St, 464, 166 N.E. 407
(1929).
25. Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 133 I11. 443, 27
N.E. 203 (1891).
26. City of Lehi v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935).
27. Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 5 P.2d 585
(1931).
28. 71 N.J.L. 574, 60 Atl. 214 (1905).
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power of the commission was declared invalid on the ground that the
district was not a regular political subdivision of the state with officials
directly answerable to the voters. As a result of this case, the district
had to be reorganized along federal lines so that its revenues could be
raised through taxes levied and collected by its constituent municipalities.
A somewhat similar system is employed ,by the Massachusetts Metropolitan
District Commission. -5
All questions of delegation of tax power have not involved the concept
of "no taxation without representation." In Thielen Metropolitan Sewerage
Con mmissiono it was argued that the creation of the Milwaukee Metro-
politan Sewerage District permitted the levy of higher taxes in Milwaukee
County than elsewhere and thus created a lack of uniformity in the state
tax structure. Thus, it was contendcd, the legislature had unconstitutionally
empowered the District Commission to levy and collect a non-uniform tax.
The court dismissed this argument with the assertion that the taxes involved
were primarily user taxes collected from those specially benefited and
were not, therefore, within the ban on non-uniform taxation.
Of course, constitutional questions of dclegating tax power do not have
any application to government-enterprise units, most of which are expressly
denied the tax power. lowever, in a case involving the Chicago Transit
Authority the tax-delegation argument was given a curious inverse twist,
and it was asserted that the Transit Authority was not a municipal cor-
poration precisely because it was denied the tax power by statute.' '[his
was an involution of the normal tax-delegation argument in which municipal
corporate status is denied to prevent the exercise of the tax power.
Actually, there arc a number of metropolitan special districts which
not only have delegated tax power but arc partially self-supporting as
well. Most functions perforned by metropolitan special districts are pro-
prietary and produce some revenue. Water and sewerage districts can
almost cover their operating cost by user charges but must generally rely
on taxes and special assessments for capital improvements?' Similarly there
are government-enterprise units which are authorized to tax to make up
for inadequate rcvcnues 3 This hybrid form of finance is quite common
among metropolitan special districts?34
29. MAss, ANrN LAWS, ch. 92, §§ 5, 26, 57 (1954).
30. 178 Wis. 34, 189 N.V. 484 (1922).
31. People v. Chicago Transit Atuthority, 392 111. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945).
32. IABLIMAN, GOVERNMiENrAL ()RGANIZATION iN I rROPOLITAN ARuAs, 70
U. of Nlichigan Governmental Studies #21 (monograph) (1951). For example, the
Chicago Sanitary District is authorized to issue reveniue bonds based on user charges.
.i. ANN. STAT., eli. 42, § 329 a (Smith-llurd 1956).
33. The relatively self-supporting Golden Gate Bridge and H ighway District is
empowered to levy taxes if necessar'. CAL. SraIn'rs & 1iWAYS CODE. § 27169. The
Buffalo Sewer Authority, although ostensibly a government-enterprise unit, imposes sewer
rentals which have the effect of special assessments for which a tax lien can be imposed.
Miller, Metropolitan Regionalism: Legal and Constitutiooal Prohlers, 105 U. OF PA.
L. Rr.v. 588, 598 (1957).
34. TAIlLEFiAN, o. cit. stpra note 32, at 70.
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In addition to the constitutional issues on delegation of tax power
and municipal debt limitations opponents of metropolitan special districts
have invoked various constitutional provisions against special legislaton.
This type of objection has even been made in instances where the particular
legislation involved was, ou its face, a general law. In City of Lehi v.
Meiling"5 the Metropolitan Water District Act of Utah was questioned as
being special legislation in the guise of general legislation because it
benefited only that portion of Utah with substantial population, in particular
the Salt Lake City area. Similarly in Thielen v. Metropolitan Sewerage Corn-
missiona" it was contended that the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage
District, though apparently created under general laws, was really the
product of special legislation since the creating statue only applied to
counties of the first class, a category which included only Milwaukee
County. Neither challenge was successful since the courts have been long
committed to upholding legislative classification of local governments where
any reasonable basis for such classification existed.-7
In those cases in which a legislature has used undisguised special
legislation to create metropolitan districts it has been contended that
the creating statutes either violated provisions against incorporation by
special act or that they violated provisions prohibiting the use of special
acts where general acts could be made applicable. In Wilson v. Board
of Trustees of the Sanitary District of Chicago38 both of the foregoing
constitutional objections were made and caused no little trouble for the
court. Despite holding the Sanitary District to be a municipal corporation,
the court held that it was not within the scope of constitutional provisions
preventing the incorporation of cities, towns and villages by special act.
The court sidestepped the second contention by holding that the constitu-
tional ban on the use of special acts when general laws could be made
applicable was addressed to the legislature and was not the subject of-
judicial review. In facing a similar set of contentions in Huron-Clinton
Metropolitan Authority v. Boards of Supervisors" the Michigan Supreme
Court had an even more difficult time upholding the creating legislation.
The Michigan legislature, in accordance with a constitutional provision
on metropolitan districts,40 had passed a general act allowing their creation 2
Yet, despite this, the legislature incorporated the 1-uron-Clinton Metro-
politan Park District by special act.'2 To make things worse, this act
35. 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935).
36. 178 Wis. 34, 189 N.V. 484 (1922). Wisconsin has a general law enabling
the creation of metropolitan sewerage districts (\\'s. SrA'r., § 66-201 ) but has nonetie-
less passed special legislation on a metropolitan sewer district for Milwaukee. LAvs OF
Wis. ch. 554, § 59.96 (1921).
37. 1 IMcQu~na¢Us, NMUNICIPA. CORPORATIONS 20 521 (3d. ed. 1930).
38. 133 Il. 443, 27 N.E. 203 (1891).
39. 300 Mich. I, I N.W.2d 430 (1942).
40. Nhicn. CONST. art. VIII, § 31 (1908).
41. MTcii. CoMtp. LAws, § 119.01 (1948).
42. Micn. Cor ap. LAws, § 119.51 (1948).
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apparently ran counter to the constitutional ban on special incorporation.
rl1ie courts, in order to uphold the act, felt constrained to hold that the
Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Park District was a quasi-corporation analogous
to a state agency and thus subject to legislative control by special act.
A fourth common constitutional objection to metropolitan special
districts involves the power of the state legislature to create overlapping
units of local government. Such objections pose a dilemma. If the court
holds that a metropolitan special district is a municipal corporation, the
district becomes subject to many legal attacks, not the least of which is
the oft-repeated argument that two municipal corporations can not exist in
the same geographic area. If the court holds the metropolitan special district
to be "sui generis," challenges would inevitably be directed at the legislative
power to create novel forms of local government unauthorized by some
constitutional provision.
The latter argument has never been laid to rest despite the fact
that the great weight of authority holds that a state needs no particular
constitutional authorization to create and reshapc its local subdivisions.A
On the contrary, state constitutions are not grants of power but limitations
on its exercise, and the United States Supreme Court has declared that
state legislatures have absolute power over their local governmental units,
subject only to state constitutional limitations." Nonetheless, the idea
persists that if a state constitution doesn't specifically refer to a certain
form of local government its creation is impliedly prohibited."5
More commonly, state courts have had to answer objections based on
the premise that one municipal corporation can not be superimposed on
another. The general answer to this averment is that two municipal
corporations may exist in the same area if they serve different purposes."4
.This general rule was applied by the court in Wilson v. Board of Trustees
of the Sanitary District of Chicago47 and in Paine v. Port of Seattle,"
and thus there is long-standing precedent to the effect that a metropolitan
special district may overlap local governments, even if it is legally con-
sidered a municipal corporation.
43. 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 509-510 (3d. ed. 1949).
44. See hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) in which the Supreme Court
refused to recognize a federally protected right in the resistance of Allegheny County
to a legislative plan for consolidating it with Pittsburgh. The court, on pages 178, and
179, made a sweeping declaration of the state's power to reorganize its subdivisions,
subject only to the restraints of state constitutional law.
45. See People ex rel. WVood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532 (1857) and Heiser v.
Metropolitan Board of I Health, ;7 N.Y. 661 (1865) upholdig metropolitan districts
which were novel units of government. lht see People ex rel. lion. Yost s'. Becker,
203 N.Y. 201, 96 N.E. 381 (19 11) ill which it was held that the creation of a "territory
of Sylvan Beach" was constitoitionaliy unauthorized- since no constitutional reference
was made to a "territory" as a form of local government. For a challenge to a state's
right to erect an interstate metropolitan district in cooperation with another state, see
City of New York v. Willcox, 115 Misc. 351, 189 N.Y. Stpp. 724 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
46. MCQUTLLIN, MuNiciPAL CoRPORAloNs 327 (3d ed. 1930).
47. 133 Ill. 443, 27 N.E. 203 (1891).
48. 70 Wash. 294, 127 Pac. 580 (1912).
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The overlapping of municipal corporations has caused related problems
pertaining to the question of office-holding. Under the law creating the
Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewerage District,49 the
city attorney for Louisville was madc the lawyer for the municipal board 0
and the Louisville City Council was given sweeping supervisory power over
the acts of the board.51 It was contended that this amounted to a violation
of the constitutional provision against the holding of two municipal offices
at once, and the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed with this contention,
holding the challenged sections invalid.5 2 The decision was based on the
theory that the Sewerage District was a municipal corporation.
Another constitutional brickbat which has been hurled at metro-
politan special districts is the charge that they unconstitutionally invade
the domain of local government. In the case of Robertson v. Zimmerman5
the Buffalo Sewer Authority was upheld as against arguments invoking the
home-rule provisions of the New York State constitution. Similar defense
of local prerogatives played a role in unavailing challenges directed at the
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City54 and the Metropolitan
Park District of Providence Plantations.55
Various other constitutional points have also been raised in litigation
involving metropolitan special districts. In several cases it was unsuccess-
fully claimed that in their acquisition of facilities districts were lending
public credit to private parties in contravention of the state constitution.'6
In California it has been held that metropolitan special districts are
municipal corporations within the meaning of constitutional provisions
making the property of municipal corporations taxable if located outside
of the corporate limits.A' In Ohio it has been held that the power of
county probate judges to appoint metropolitan park commissioners isn't
an invalid delegation of an executive function.58 In Illinois it has been
held that the Chicago Transit Authority can be headed by a mixture
of gubernatorial and mayoral appointees without violating constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers. 59 However, these cases represent
only a few of a number of isolated holdings.
49. Ky. REV. STAT., § 76,010 (Baldwin 1955).
50. Ky. REV. STAT., § 76.060 (Baldwin 1955).
51. Ky. REV. STAT., § 76.091 (Baldwin 1955).52. Rash v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 309 Ky.442, 217 S.W.2d 232 (1949).
53. 268 N.Y. 52, 196, N.E. 740 (1935).
54. City of Lehi v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 l'.2d 530 (1935).
55. In Re Opinion of the Justices, 34 R.I. 191, 83 AtI. 3 (1912).
56. City of Lehi v. Nciliug, 87 Utah 237, -8 P.2d 530 (1935); Paine v. Port of
Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 127 Pac. 580 (1912).
57. Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. Cal. v. Riverside County, 21 Cal. App.2d
640, 134 Pac. 249 (1943).58. State v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 120 Ohio St. 464, 166 N.E. 407 (1929)ft'd. 281 U.S. 74 (1930).
59. People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 III. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945).
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Of more general interest are the constitutional problems pertaining to
metropolitan special districts operating in interstate areas. 10 The most
illustrious of these bi-state districts is the Port of New York Authority
which has served as a model of interstate cooperation and efficiency.
1
Comparable to the Port of New York Authority are the Delaware River
Port Authority 2 (formerly the l)elaware River Joint Commission) and the
13i-State Development AgencyA1: The former unit serves the Philadelphia-
Camden area, and the latter unit is designed to perform a number of
functions in the St. Louis-E".ast St. Louis area. These three special districts
are the most prominent example of interstate metropolitan governmen t.64
Obviously such districts raise certain jurisdictional problems since they
don't clearly fall into any of the traditional categories of American federal-
is. ni Ell However, for the present these districts are bodies corporate and
politic of the states which jointly created them.65
rhe Port of New York Authority technically enjoys the unique dis-
tinction of being an interstate municipal corporation since the laws of
New York and New Jersey refer to it as "a municipal corporate entity of
the two states."'- However, the rather close ties of the Authority to the
state governments of New York and New Jersey would tend to negate
the aforementioned statutory language. Early opponents of the Port
Authority did not view it as any normal unit of local government and
brought suit alleging that the Port Authority District was a quasi-political
subdivision existing in violation of the U. S. Constitution which made no
provision for such a component of American federalism. It was further
alleged that New York ceded its sovereignty to an extra-territorial unit.
60. A further problem exists with reference to international communities (Buffalo,
Detroit, F.l Paso) and metropolitan areas on the international waters of the Great
Lakes (Milwaukee, IDuluth-Superior, Bay City, Erie, Toledo, Chicago, Cleveland).
61. Congress consented to the formation of the Port Authority in Res. of Aug. 23,
1921, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174. For a legal article on the Port Authority and its background
see Edelstein, The Authority Plan-Tool of Modern Government, 28 CORNELL L. Q,
177 (1943).
62. The compact changing the Delaware River Joint Commission to the Delaware
River Port Authority was consented to in Act of July 17, 1952. cl. 921, 66 Stat. 738.
63. The compact establishing the Bi-Statc Development Agency and the Bi-State
Metropolitan District was consented to in Res. of Aug. 30, 1950, ch. 829, 64 Stat.
658. 'Ihis metropolitan district has not Splug fully into action, hot it has broad
multifunctional authority and may turn Out to le a model for future metropolitan
government in interstate areas.
64. A slightly different metropolitan district is the National Capital Park ard
Planning Commission. 40 tJ.SC § 71, which s'lrrs the District of Coltnubia and its
suburban areas in Marvlaid and Virgiria . For an article on the governmental problems
of communities spanning state boundaries see Grant, The Governmet of Interstate
Urhan Areas, 8 Wr'.sr. Pmi.. Q. 90 (1955).
64a. It may be, in %ears to one. that state constitutional restrictions will be
inapplicable to these districts on the ground that they are creatures of national law
inder a federally approved compact,
65. Art. Ill of the Port of New York Authority Compact: Art. lI of the Compact
Establishing the Bi-State Development Agency and li-State Metropolitan District; Art. I
of the the Delaware River Port Authority Suipplemental Agreement.
66. N.J. STAT. 32: 1-33 (1940).
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Both allegations were judicially rejected,6 7 and subsequently the states of
New York and New Jersey sealed the verdict by providing for gubernatorial
veto of Port Authority actions. 8
Another class of metropolitan special districts which merits separate
attention is metropolitan public authorities, some of which enjoy a rather
anomalous constitutional status. Unlike a number of other metropolitan
special districts metropolitan public authorities are almost invariably state-
imposed and lack the voluntary character usually associated with municipal
corporations ' The additional factor that they have no tax power makes
it even more difficult to liken them to municipal corporations. However,
the Chicago Transit Authority has been held to be a municipal corporation,
its lack of tax power notwithstanding.70 Moreover, the Massachusetts Legis-
lature, in creating the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Boston, referred
to it as an "incorporated municipality." 71 Similar legislative language has
been used in referring to the Port of New York Authority 2 However, for
purposes of constitutional construction it would seem that government-
enterprise metropolitan districts are less analogous to municipal corporations
than tax-supported metropolitan districts.
THE JURIDICAL STATUS OF TIE METROPOLITAN SPECIAL DISTRICr IN
NoN-CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
The legal status of the metropolitan special district is of significance
in a number of cases unrelated to constitutional controversies. A great
many of these non-constitutional cases have been tort cases in which
the courts have had to decide whether a metropolitan special district
was protected from suit under the principle of governmental immunity.
In order to render a decision on the question of governmental immunity
the courts have had to classify the inetropolitan special district in relation
to the traditional units of government The courts, in general, have had
but three alternatives. They could liken the metropolitan special district
to a state agency, in which case its immunity would be virtually complete;
they could find the metropolitan special district comparable to a county-
like quasi-corporation, in which case its immunity would depend on the
degree to which common-law rules of county immunity had been abro-
gated in the jurisdiction; and lastly, the courts could liken the metropolitan
67. City of New York v. Willcox, 115 Misc. 351, 189 N.P. Supp. 724 (Sup.
Ct. 1921).
68. N.t. LAvws, cl. 700 (1927); N.J. LAws el. 333 (1927).
69. PuBi.ic AUTHoRiTIrS IN "lE STATES, the Council of State Governments,
Chicago, 1953, pp. 38-39. The New York Constitution actually requires that authorities
be established by special legislation, art. 10, § 5.
70. People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 I11. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945).
71. MASS. STAT. ch. 383, § 1 (19291. It is very seldom that a legislature explicitly
designates a special district as a municipal corporation, although the Alabama legislature
has thus designated municipal power districts. AI.A. CODE tit. 18, § 2 (1940).
72. See statutes cited note 66 supra.
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special district to a municipal corporation possessed of immunity in cases
arising from the exercise of its relatively few governmental functons.
Generally speaking, metropolitan special districts have not been viewed
as state agencies for purposes of tort liability. State agencies are considered.
to have a purely governmeutal nature which doesn't include a proprietary
capacity in which they can be sued,73 and the courts have been reluctant
to clothe metropolitan special districts with such complete immunity.
Even where such a classification would be apparently justified, as in the
case of the highly dependent Massachusetts Metropolitan District Com-
mission, 74 immunity has been waived by statute.75 In recent years the New
York and New Jersey legislatures have enacted such waiver statutes in
regard to the Port of New York Authority," which had formerly enjoyed
some degree of immunity. Such statutory waiver of immunity" is common
and it is therefore seldom that a metropolitan special district can claim
to be the alter ego of the state to protect itself from tort suits. 8
More coinionly, the courts have judged the tort liability of metro-
politan special districts according to the governmental-proprietary dichotomy
connected with suits against municipal corporations."' In terms of results
it has mattered little whether the courts have viewed a metropolitan special
district as a quasi-corporation or a municipal corporation because the
modern trend has been to hold that the former entity has a proprietary
capacity in which it can be sued."" For example, in Morrison v. Smith
Bros.s it was held that the East Bay Municipal Utility District (Oakland)
though not a true municipal corporation, nonetheless was quasi-municipal
in nature and thus subject to tort suit on the same basis as a municipality.
73, PROSSF1, ToRTs 770-771 (2d ed. 1955).
74. The Metropolitan District Coninmissioi was forned in 1919 and combined
under its iurisdiction three pre-existing special districts. It was organized as part of a
general realignment of state departments and was actually treated as a state agency.
MASS. SrAT. ch. 350, § 123 (1919).
75. MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 92, §§ 15, 36 (1954).
76. N.J. STAT. 32: 1-157 (1940).
77. Marmor v. Port of New York Authority, 203 Misc. 568, 116 N.Y.S.2d 177
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
78. For purposes of tort liability the Port oif New Orleans Board has bccn deemed
a state agency iniune from stuit. Miller. Royal Indemnity Co. Intervener v. Board
of Conmm'rs. of Port of New Orleans, 199 La. 1070, 7 So.2d 355 (1942). For is
somewhat related case with an opposite holding see Lowes v. Pcnnsylvaia Turnpike
Comm., 125 F. Supp. 681 (NI.D. Pa. 195) in which a state authority was held liable in
tort despite the fact that it had been granted no independent corporate status and in
the face of language declaring its function to be "an essential governmental function
of the Commonwealth."
79, United States v. Port of Portland. 147 Fed. 865 (1). Ore. 1906); Morrison
v. Smith Bros., 211 Cal. 36, 293 Pac. 53 (1930); NcoenscwIMander v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm., 48 A.2d 593 (NId. App. 1946); Barmel v. Minneapolis-St.
Paul Sanitary Dist., 201 Minn. 622. 277 NV. 208 (1938).
80. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1079 (1951) on the increasing scope of county tort
liability.
81. 211 Cal. 36, 293 Pac. 53 (1930).
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Since metropolitan special districts perform most all of their activities in a
proprietary capacity, governmental immunity is rarely invoked.82
Though the status of the metropolitan special district is of primary
importance in cases involving constitutional construction and governmental
immunity from suit, it occasionally has significance in other contexts. For
example, in State ex rel. Halmrast v. King"3 it was held that the Minneapolis-
St. Paul Sanitary District was "an independent corporation for municipal
purposes" and thus not a state agency within the scope of statutory pension
plans pertaining to state employees. In State v. Metropolitan Park District
of Tacoma8 4 criminal charges were brought against the Tacoma Park
District for requiring female employees in a park restaurant to work
overtime in contravention of state laws. It was held by the court that the
Tacoma Metropolitan Park District was a municipal corporation and thus
not subject to criminal prosecution for willful ultra vires acts. 5 In Nelson-
Johnston & Doudna v. Metropolitan Utilities District"" the court held that
the Omaha Metropolitan Utilities District was a municipal corporation in
the broad sense and thus had implied power to perform acts reasonably
necessary to the fulfillment of its proprietary function.
METROPOLITAN SPECIAL DIsT'ie's AS CONTRASTED
'To O-1ER SPECIAL Dis'rmCs
From a legal and constitutional view, metropolitan special districts
differ from other special districts. These differences stem front certain inon-
legal characteristics which are peculiar to the metropolitan special district,
the most important being the simple matter of geographical location.8 7
Unlike other special districts, the metropolitan special district is designed
to serve an area roughly co-terminous with the boundaries of a given
metropolis, although in some cases the district is suburban or confined
to the central cityY Other special districts are overwhelmingly non-urban
by location,"" although some of them include part or all of a metropolitan
area within their extensive boundaries."0
82. See Jones v. Al Johnson Const. Co., 211 Minn. 123, 300 N.\. 447 (1941)
in which blasting operations of Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District were not protected
by governmental immunity and were held to be a private nuisance.
83, 193 Minn. 405, 2758 N.W. 583 (1935).
84. 100 Wash. 449, 171 Pac. 254 (1918).
85. For a case expressly denying that metropolitan park districts are municipal
corporations see State ex rel. Koontz v. Board of Park Cornn'rs. of the City of I Iuntington,
131 W. Va, 417, 47 S.E.2d 689 (1948).
86. 137 Neb. 871, 291 N.W. 558 (1940).
87. For a classic definition of the metropolitan special district see Studenski,
The Government of Metropolitan Areas, National Municipal League, New York, 1930,
p. 256.
88. TABLEMAN, op. cit. Yura note 32, at 60, 61. Authoress states that of 103
metropolitan special districts surveyed by her, 71 were area-wide, 20 were suburban
and 12 were city districts.
89. Of 14,405 special districts only 3.180 tuch on standard metropolitan areas,
and of these 3,180 districts 1,185 touch only the outlying sections of metropolitan
areas. U.S. Cur. of the Census; 1 U.S. Census of Governments: Local Governments in
Standard Metropolitan Areas 6 (1957).
90. ibid.
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Geography aside, metropolitan special districts differ from their country
cousins in regard to the number of functions which they assume. Tra-
ditionally, the non-nictropolitaii district has pcrformed but one function
and has not taken on additional duties."i Among the typical functions
of the non-metropolitan district are such activities as land reclamation,
firc control, irrigation, and drainage?- By way of contrast, metropolitan
special districts arc quite often multi-functional in scope (although not
half as often as their proponents would like). In urban areas, problems
of water supply and sewage disposal have often been assumed by the
same district.' ' There are other examples along the same line showing
the coibintaion under oic district of two or more of such urban functions
as control of port facilities and air terminals, transportation and rapid
transit, air pollution, parks, and regional planning. 4
Furthermore, mctropolitan special districts often have a large number
of employees and a complex financial structure' whereas the average
special district has very modest financial undertakings and limited per-
sonnel. " Census reports shows that all the large operations conducted
by special districts are inder the direction of metropolitan special districts,
inchding such wcll-known govcrnmcntal units as the Chicago Transit
Authority, the Metropolitan Transit Authority (Boston), the Port of New
York Authority, the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago,,7
the East Bay Municipality Utility District and the Washington Suburban
Sanitary District.
The economic, operational, and geographical factors which differentiate
the metropolitan special district from other districts have occasionally led
courts to differentiate them legally. Since non-metropolitan special districts
are gencrally located outside of urban areas and perform but one function,
they are seldoin held to be mnicipal corporations and often found to be
state agencies or quasi-corporate cTItitics performing a purely governmental
activity. This has important ramifications in the area of tort liability.
91. Of 14,405 special districts, 13,743 are single-finction units. U.S, Bir. of the
Census; I U.S. Census of Governments: Governments ini the United States 30-31 (1957).
92. Id. at 7, showing that 18% of special districts are for fire protection, 16% for
soil conservation and 15% for drainage.
93. See note 91 supra at 31, showing that 144 ont of 662 milti-finictional linits
perform both sanitation and water supply sen-ices,
94. For specific listing of someni multi-finctional metropolitan special districts see
rAB.r.MAN, O .cit. supira note 32, at 60-61; Io3.,IENS, SPE.CIAL IDSTICT GOVExRNsi.ENTS
IN TiE: UNiTOr STATUS. 68 (1957).
95, For example, in 1952 the Chicago Transit Authority had 17,742 employees
and revenues in excess of $119,064,000 while in the same year the Port of New York
Authority showed an outstanding long-tcrm debt of $241,688,000. U.S. Bur. of the
Census: Special District Govcrnments in the United States (No. 33) 3 (1954).
96. Id. at 1-2. showing that 74% of special districts had incomc of less than
$10,000 in 1952; 71% had no long-term debt and only a little over 1% employed more
than 100 people,
97. This is the new name for the Chicago Sanitary District. lowever. the old
name has been used elsewhere in the paper because it corresponds to case and statutory
references.
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The western states, which contain numerous rural special districts,
have split right down the middle on whether non-mctropolitan districts are
immune from tort liability." The case of Bennett v. Brown County \Vater
Improvement District No. 1,111 is a good recent example of the opposing
theories on governmental immunity for rural special districts. The majority
advanced the thesis that rural special districts are quasi-corporations
analogous to the county and thus immune from suit. In addition, the
majority distingushcd the earlier Texas case of Hidalgo County Vater Im-
provement District v. Peter" ' which seemed to limit governmental im-
munity. The dissent denied the county analogy and asserted that even if
it were correct, it would not render the district immune, since the modern
trend is to recognize that when any government enters into a proprietary
undertaking it must assume tort liability in the performance of such
activity.
California, which leans somewhat toward the majority view in the
aforementioned Texas case,' 0' has not applied this theory to metropolitan
special districts. In Morrison v. Smith Bros.,10 12 the court discussed at
great length the well-established California view that rural special districts
are public corporate entities performing a state governmental function.
After a summnation of the semantics on the subject, the court held that
municipal utility districts were clearly different from rural districts and
were on a par with municipal corporations as regards tort liability.
California has also differentiated between rural and metropolitan special
districts for purposes of constitutional construction. For years California
courts have wrestled with the problem of whether special districts were
municipal corporations within the meaning of the constitutional clause
subjecting the property of municipal corporations to tax if it was located
outside corporate limits.5 05 To settle the cases arising under the clause,,
the California courts crected a dualistic theory under which metropolitan
special districts were distinguished from other districts. The Metropolitan
\Vater District of Southern California was held to be a municipal cor-
98. The following cases hold special districts immune fron suit: Todd v. Kaw
Valley Drainage Dist., 109 Kan. 754, 201 Pac. 1096 (1921); Sherwood v. Worth
County Drainage Dist, No. 1, 298 Mo. 82, 250 S.W. 605 (1923); Bennett v. Brown
County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 153 Tcx. 599, 272 S.W.2d 498 (1954).
The following cases stand for the proposition that rural special districts can be liable
in tort; Johnson v. Burley [rr., Dist., 78 Idaho 392, 304 P.2d 912 (1956); Newman
v. Bitter Root Irr. Dist., 95 Mont. 521, 28 P.2d 195 (1933); Gable v. the Pathfinder
Irr. Dist., 163 Neb. 349, 79 S.W.2d 708 (1956). See also the following annots.,
33 A.L.R. 77 (1924), 69 A.L.R. 1231 (1930), 74 A.L.R. 898 (1931), 160 A.L.R.
11659(1946).
99. 153 '[cx. 599, 272 S.W.2d 498 (1954).
100. 37 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Coin. App. 1931).
101. Whiteman v,. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 234, 212 Pac.
7061(1922); Nissa v. Cordua Irr. Dist., 204 Cal. 542, 269 Pac. 171 (1928).
102. 211 Cal. 36, 293 Pac, 53 (1930).
103. CAL. CONST., art. 13 § 1 (1879).
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potation within the meaning of the clause,104 but rural districts were held
to le state agencies inmnimine from local taxation 10a Recent California cases
have obliterated this dichotomy and have classified rural special districts
as municipal corporations for the purposes of construing the constitutional
provision on tax immunity 6." The California courts adopted the position
that the clause on tax imnimunity was meant to protect local governments
from losing their taxablc property and was thus meant to be construed
liberally. This eminently sound construction has not, however, resolved
the question of the relative status of metropolitan and non-metropolitan
special districts, since the California holding was quite limited and repre-
scnted a departure from the typical wcstern view which is to classify rural
special districts as quasi-corporations. 1'0
THIE GOVERNMENTAL ATrRIBUTnS OF TIlE METROPOLITAN SPECIAL DIsrRrcT
The metropolitan special district is a creature of the state, and its
governmental nature must be determined by assessing its degree of depen-
dence on the state. To the extent that a metropolitan special district
possesses powers of self-determination, it resembles the average municipality
or home-rule county; but to the extent that it remains highly reliant on its
creator, it resembles the dependent quasi-corporation. To arrive at the
degree of local autonomy possessed by a metropolitan special district,
one must look to the terms of its creation and the extent of local control
over its continuing opcration.
The initiative in forming metropolitan districts is either at the state
level under special legislation or at the local level under gencral enabling
legislation. In some instmces, as in the case of the Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer District,'' 8 the initiative has been at the local level under an
enabling amendment to the state constitution. Where metropolitan special
districts have been formed at the state level, they have almost invariably
been the result of special acts of creation. The Massachusetts Metropolitan
District Commission,"" the Baltimore County Metropolitan District,' °
104. Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. Cal. v. Riversidc County, 21 Cal. App.2d
640, 134 Pac. 249 (1943).
105. Lagua Beach County \Water l)ist. v. Orange Comty, 30 Cal. App.2d 740,
87 P.2d 46 (1939).
106. Turlock Irr. Dist. v. Tuolumne County, 124 Cal. App.2d 611, 269 P.2d 129(19541; Rock Creek Water District v. Claveras County, 29 Cal.2d 7, 172 P.2d 863
(1946
107. State v. Yuma Irr. Dist., 55 Ariz. 178, 99 l.2d 704 (1940); Logan County
Irr. Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 133 P.2d 530 (1943); State v. Lincoln Conty
Power Dist. No. 1, 60 Nev. 401. Ill P.2d 528 (1941); Willacy Coumty Water
Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1. v. Abeudroth, 142 Tex. 320, 177 S.W.2d 936(1944); Freenan v. Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, 273 P.2d 174.
108. Mo. CoNs'r., art. VI, § 30 (a) (1945). This clause authorized the people of
St. Louis County and St. Louis City to establish metropolitan districts. This blank-
cheek delegation of power was unsuccessfuily challenged iii State v. Metropolitan
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 365 Mo. 1, 275 S.W.2d 225 (1955).
109. MAss. STrT. ch. 350, § 123 (1919).
110. Maryland Acts of 1924. ch. 539.
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the Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District,'" the Milwaukee Metropolitan
Sewerage Commission, 2-' the Port of New York Authority,"13 the Washing-
ton Suburban Sanitary Commission' and the Metropolitan Transit Dis-
trict' (Boston) are prominent products of such special legislation. All
these listed metropolitan special districts were imposed from above upon
the localities involved, and the involuntary manner of their imposition is
somewhat incompatible with the concept that metropolitan special districts
are analogous to municipal corporations.
The fact that the state has undertaken the creation of a metropolitan
special district has not always meant that local sentiment has gone un-
regarded. Although the Hartford Metropolitan District was the result of
a special act," 0 the voters in the district were permitted a referendum
which allowed for the non-inclusion of dissenting municipalities.'17 A
similar referendum was used in the Detroit area after the Michigan legis-
lature formed the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan District except that the
legislature allowed for the non-inclusion of dissenting counties.)19
Special legislation has not been the sole device used for creating
metropolitan special districts, and numerous state laws provide for the
creation of metropolitan special districts by the local areas involved. Despite
the fact that the Michigan and Connecticut legislatures used special acts
to establish metropolitan districts in their largest urban areas, both states
have general laws permiting the organization of such governmental en-
tities.'"' The enabling acts of Connecticut and Michigan differ from those
of most other states in that they include a variety of functional districts
within the scope of one act. California, on the other hand, provides
separate acts for municipal utility districts,"-" metropolitan water districts,' 2'
air pollution control districts,' 22 and numerous other districts. As a result,
the East Bay Municipal Utility District, the Los Angeles Air Pollution
Control District and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
are each formed under different enabling laws. Illinois, which ranks first
in number of special districts,' 23 also has a number of different enabling
acts, but the Chicago Sanitary District,'24 the Chicago Park District,'25.
111. Minn. Law 1933, ch. 341.
112. Laws of Winsconsin, ci. 554 (1921).
113. N.Y. Laws 1921, ch. 154; N.J. Laws 1921, ch. 151.
114. Maryland Acts of 1918, ch. 122.
115. MASS. STAT., ch. 383, § 1 (1929).
116. Special Laws of Connecticut, 1929, Sp. No. 511.
117. Ed. at § 96.
118. Mich. Pub. Acts 1939, No. 147.
119. MNici. Comp. LAWS § 119.1 (1948); CONN. Gn. STATS., § 374 (Supp.
1955).
120. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE. § 11501.
121. CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 35-1.
122. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24198.
123. U.S. BUR. OF TIJE CoNSUS; 1 U.S. CENSUS OF GOVIRNMINTS: COVERNMENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1957).
124. Ill. Laws of 1889, p. 125.
125. 111 Laws of 1933, p. 725.
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and the Chicago 'ransit Authority ' 1 were products of special legislation
of the kind which permitted local ralification or rejection.
or the most part, general enabling acts provide for local initiative in
forming a district. This initiative nornally takes one of two forms, the
voter petition or ordinance of some local governing body..The Ohio Park
District requires a petition by a majority of the district voters or an
ordinance of some local government. 12 7 For obvious reasons the latter
alternative is more practical in Ohio, but not all states have such stringent
petition requirements. The Metropolitan Park District Act of Washington
requires only fifteen per cent of the voters,'2 the Port District Act of
the same state calls for only ten per cent,'' and the Metropolitan Sewerage
District Act of Wisconsin requires a petition from only five per cent of
the voters.'3 0 The Municipal Utility Act of California goes to the opposite
extreme from the Ohio Park District Act and makes initiative by ordinance
depend on approval by at least half the public agencies involved while it
requires a petition of only tell per cent of the voters in the alternative.'
Once a locality has initiated a proposal for the formation of a
metropolitan special district, the statutes provide for a variety of ratification
devices. Illinois and California have gelierally lcaned toward the popular
referendumY.'2 Sometimes, as under the Metropolitan Water District Act
of Southern California,1"' the referendum is based on a system of con-
current majorities in which each intra-district local unit registers its approval
or disapproval as a separate entity. Such a federal type of voting has
been commonly used in connections with referendums on metropolitan
special district created at the state level.' h i other instances, for example,
the California Air Pollution Control District Act,' 5 ratification has
been taken out of the hands of the voters and placed in the hands of
certain elected local officials. In a somewhat novel provision, the California
Bridge and Highway District Act allows for ratification by petition as an
alternative to an election.''6  Another unusual device for approving the
creation of special districis is the delegation of ratification power to the
local judiciary, a method which is used under the Wisconsin Metropolitan
126. 11 Laws of 1945, p. 1171.
127. Onm REv. CODE § 1545.02 (Baldwin 1953).
128. WAsH. R V. CODE § 35.61.020 (1951).
129. WAsH. REV. CoM, § 53.04.020 (1951).
130. XVss. STAT. ANN. § 66,201 (1957) (not to be confused with \Vs. SVrA'r. ANN,§ 59.96 applicable to the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District).
131. CAT. 1PUB. Ut1L. Cul, §§ 11611-11614 (petition of 10% of the voters);§§ 11581-11583 (request by resolution of half or more of public agencies involved).
132. "ABLEMIAN, op. cit. supra note 32, at 65,
133. CAL. WATER Corn: ANN. § 35-4.
134. Such was the case in the lartford Metropolitan District and Iluron-Clinton
Metropolitan Park District mentioned stora.
135. CAL. IlEAu'ir & SmIj.i'ry CoDE § 24205. The county board of supervisors both
initiates and decides on the cleation of a district. This differs froni the usual California
practice of allowing popular vote.
136. CAL. STREET'rS & II'WAYS Conic §§ 27040-27048. The California law calls for
the initiation of a proposal by ordinance and ratificalion by petition or election.
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Sewerage District Act' 37 and the Ohio Park District Act. 38 The latter
delegation of power was challenged in a constitutional suit.'-3 9
Even though local voter participation is often required at the initiation
or ratification stage, metropolitan district officials arc seldom directly
answerable to the electorate once the district has been created. A great
many metropolitan special districts are headed by appointed directors.
In some instances, the governor has complete control over the appointive
process as in the Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission, 40 the
Port of New York Authority,' and the Hartford Metropolitan District.
2
In other metropolitan districts, such as the Metropolitan Transit District
(Boston)' 45 and the Chicago Transit Authority, 44 the governing boards are
composed of a psuedo-federal mixture of mayoral and gubernatorial
appointees. Still more commonly, the power of appointment is wielded
at the local level.
As a gesture to localism, state legislatures have often left the selection
of metropolitan district directors up to local officials. For example, the
mayor of Chicago can appoint the commissioners of the Chicago Park
District;'' 5 in Ohio county probate judges have power of appointment
over metropolitan park commissioners;" 4" and in Kentucky the members
of the board of the Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District are appointed by the mayor of Louisville (3) and the county
judge (2). 4 7 More frequently, however, the local appointive power is given
to city governing bodies, as in the case of the Metropolitan Water District
of Southern California,"' or to county governing bodies, as in the Golden
Cate Bridge and Highway I)istrict.'Y9 These last two methods of appoint-
137. Vs. STAT. ANN. § 66.201 (1957).
138. Oio REV. CODE § 1545.04 (Baldwin 1953).
139. State v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 120 Ohio St. 464, 16 N.E. 407 (1929).
140. MAss. STAT. ch. 350, § 124 (1919).
141. N.J. Laws 1930, ch. 245; N.Y. Laws 1921, ch. 154, § 3. Half the appointments
are made by the New Jersey governor and half by the New York governor.
142. Special Laws of Con, 1933, Sp. No. 347. Actually, the original act establishing
the Hartford Metropolitan District allowed for election of commissioners in two
"forms," one form consisting of a commissioner from each city in the district and
one form consisting of commissioners to be chosen on an at large basis in staggered
terms. However, the election feature was postponed and finally eliminated, except
that the district voters still can force an election by means of an onerous petition.
Connecticut governors have, therefore, always staffed the whole commission, subject
to the limitations of the original act.
143. MAss. STAT. ch. 383, § 2 (1929).
144. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 320 (Smith-llurd 1934). John Bollens has
commented on the unnecessarily complex nature of this appointive process (BOLL.NS,
op. cit. supra note 94, at 90) which involves the governor, mayor of Chicago, The
Illinois State Senate and the Chicago City Council, not to mention the geographic
limitations it imposes on the governor's choice.
145. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, § 333.3 (Sinith-Hurd 1951). The city council has
power of ratification and rejection.
146. Oino REv. CODE § 1545.05 (Baldwin 1953).
147. Ky. REV. STAT. § 76.030 (1952).
148, CAL. WATER CODE ANN. § 35-6.
149. Cal. Streets & ll'ways Code § 27121.
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inent occasionally have an added feature in that they permit the larger
localities to appoint more representatives. 50
Another concession to localism has been the designation of city and
county officials as cx officio directors of metropolitan special districts. This
system has certain merits in that it moderates the friction which often
results from overlapping governments and places responsibility on elected
officials without creating an nnwieldly new group of elective offices. 1'
County governing bodies comprise the ex officio leadership of the Los
Angeles Air Pollution Control 1)istrict,52 and the Baltimore County
Metropolitan District.," Also the mayors of St. Paul and Minneapolis
are ex officio members of the governing body of the Minneapolis-St. Paul
Sanitary l)istrict, ' but the ex officio method is not common. It is especially
rare for a state official to be an cx officio member of a metropolitan
district board or commission although the Attorney General and the
Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are cx officio members
of the 16-man Delaware River Port Authority Colnmmission.1'5 '
The last important method of electing metropolitan special district
officials is the device of direct popular election. The democratic method
has been used in the Chicago Sanitary District for years,'", and it is also
employed in a number of other districts, including the Sacramento Municipal
Utility District,' the East Bay Municipal Utility District,' M the Portland
(Me.) Water District, ' -"" the Omaha Metropolitan Utilities District, 6 0
and the Seattle Port District.'" Some of the foregoing districts employ a
modified ward system in which some or all of the directors or commis-
sioners are nominated from specific wards but run at large.2' 2 This guarantees
that each ward will have representation. The Portland Water District uses
150. Both the Metropolitan 'ater l)istrit of Southern California and the Golden
Cate Bridge and IIighway District accord added representation to the larger local
governments in the district, but the former district establishes representation by relative
values of taxable property while the latter district uses a population scale.
151. Bollens, The Problem of Government in the San Francisco Bay Region,
Bureau of Public Administration, U. of California Press, Berkeley, 1948, pp. 124-125.
Bollens reconmends federalistic, ex officio represcntation on special district boards.
152. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETEY CODE § 24220.
153. Maryland Acts of 1924, ch. 539 § 2.
154. NiNN. ANN. LAWS § 445.04 (1954).
155. Art. II of Delaware River Port Authority Supplemental Agreement consented
to in Act of July 17, 1952, ch. 291, 66 Stat. 73A.
156. The Chicago Sanitary District was created in 1889, although it was not really
activated for several years thercafter. This district has a strong democratic tradition
which, unfortunately, has been marred on occasion by political scandals. For election
provisions see ILL. ANN. SrAT. cl. 42, § 322 (Smith-lhord 1957).
157. CALIFORNIA PUB. UrtL. Com § 11648.
158. Ibid.
159. Maine Private and Special Laws of 1907, ch. 433 § 9.
160. NeB. REv. STAT. § 14-1003 (1943).
161. WAsH, Rrv. Con § 3;.61,050 (19;1).
162. The California Municipal Utility Districts and the Seattle Port District use this
system.
[VOL, XIII
METROPOLITAN SPECIAL DISTRICTS
a more clearly federal system in which constituent cities elect members
to the board. 63
Although the average metropolitan special district lacks the popular
elective feature of municipalities or counties, it possesses many of the
attributes of the more traditional units of government. Almost without
exception, metropolitan special districts have the power to acquire, hold,
and dispose of property and to exercise eminent domain. Such grants of
power have not gone unchallenged. In People v. Chicago Transit Author-
ity, 1' 4 it was unsuccessfully argued that the statutory power of the Transit
Authority to acquire private transportation lines unconstitutionally denied
equal protection of the laws to private utility companies. In State v.
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District,' 5 the court upheld the delegation
of condemnation power to the district, stating that such power was virtually
indispensible to the performance of its function. However, in State ex rel.
Mower v. Superior Ct., 66 the Washington Supreme Court refused the
power of eminent domain to a metropolitan park district on the ground
that the legislature had fuiled to establish a statutory procedure for the
taking of property by park districts, despite constitutional language re-
quiring such protection for landowners.6 7
There is no more important characteristic of governmental sovereignty
than the tax power, and with the exception of government-enterprise units,
this power is always possessed by metropolitan special districts. In addition,
they normally have such standard corporate powers as perpetual succession
and possession of a seal. However, metropolitan special districts often lack
the power of self-dissolution.6 This question of dissolution of special
districts is by no means an abstract point since local antagonisms within
a district can lead to attempted withdrawals, 69 and this question deserves
more legislative attention than it has received.
Another normal characteristic of the average municipal corporation
is the possession of a police force. This particular attribute is found to a
limited extent in some metropolitan districts,7 and where the legislature
has delegated power to maintain a police force, it has usually seen fit to
confer on special district policemen the same power possessed by other
163. The system is, however, weighted in favor of more populous Portland.
164. 292 II. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945).
165. 275 S.W.2d 225 (1955).
166. 43 Wash.2d 123, 260 P.2d 355 (1953).
167. WAsL. Consr. art. I, § 16.
168. BOLLENS, op. cit. supra note 94, at 20. This normal feature of municipal
government is usually provided for in California, but Illinois has been quite delinquent
in this regard.
169. The Attorney General of Michigan has opined that Wayne Comity cannot
withdraw from the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan District without legislative permission.
[May 31, 19501 Micu. ATT'Y Gr.t OPS. 1219.
170. Mvfetropolitan park districts usually have a police force, but sanitary and sewer
districts do not have as much need for them. The Chicago Sanitary District has aban-
doned its police force. JONEs,NIETROPOLITAN GOVERN.MENT, 96 (1942).
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policemen or constables within the state,"'i subject, of course, to the
geographical limits of the district. 1 2 Strangely enough, nrban areas in
America have bcen reluctant to institutc gcncral-jurisdiction metropolitan
police forces although the police function would seem to be well adapted
to such integration. As a result, such police forces as exist in metropolitan
districts are not large and are designed for enforcing laws peculiarly relevant
to the district function.''
The power to annex, so common to municipalities, is also possessed
by a number of metropolitan special districts. The general enabling acts
which confer the power of annexation usually place the initiative on the
territory to be annexed. 7 4 Consent to the proposal is then usually sought
from the governing body of the annexing territory,175 and under some laws
additional approval must be given by the voters of the territory to be
annexed. 7 ' Under the Ohio Park District Act judicial ratification is neces-
sary after approval of the annexation petition by the park commissioners.' 7
In districts organized along federal lines annexation to the district may
occur indirectly through annexation to a constituent city."t However, the
greatest modern expansion of a single metropolitan special district has not
occurred under general enabling laws permitting annexation. The Chicago
Sanitary District, which has experienced great growth, has acquired its
present size through a series of special annexation acts by the Illinois
171. For example, N. J. STAr. Ax,, 32:2-25 (1910) conferring such power on
Port of New York Authority policemen in New Jersey; CAL. PUn. RESOURCES CODE,
§ 5561 conferring such power on regional park district policemien; MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 92, § 61 (1954), conferring such power on policcmen employed by the Massa-
chusetts Metropolitan District Commission.
172. Massachusetts law permits policemen of the Metropolitan District Commission
to exercise jurisdiction outside of the district on the property of the water and sewage
districts located there. Mxss, ANN. L.xws ch. 92, § 61 (1954).
173. As an example, the Port of New York Authority Police are particularly charged
with the policing of bridges, tunnels and entrances thereto. N.J. SErT. ANN. 32:2-25.
174, '[his is true in annexation in Ohio metropolitan park districts (Gin1o REv.
CoDE § 1545.15 (Baldwin 1953), Washington metropolitan park districts (Wsn.
REV. CODE § 35.61.250 (1951) and California regional park districts (CAL. PuB.
RESOURCES CoonF § 5573). However, the California Municipal Utility District Act
permits the annexing body to take the initiative when the territory to be annexed
is within the district boundries but not within the district. C,4. PJH. U.T1.. CODE
§ 13652.
175. See, e.g., Ohio Park District Act (Ouo lr'. Coo., § 1545.15) (Baldwin
1953 and the California Municipal Utility District Act (CAL. PUn. UTIr.. CODE,
§ 1324).
176. See, eg., the election provisions of the California Regional Park District Act
Pun. RESOURCLS CODE, § 5576) and the election provisions of the Metropolitan
ark District statutes of Washington (Rn;v. ConE oF Wxsn. § 35.61.270).
177. Oino Rnv. Coot § 1345.15 (Baldwin 1953). As a matter of fact, the
commissioners of the Clcveland Metropolitam Park District have turned down numerous
requests for annexation to the district. BOLLENS, Spynci&i. DIsTRIcT GOVERNMENTS IN
'riE UNITED STATES, o cit. supra, note 94 at 73.
178. The Municipal Utility Districts of California, which are quasi-federal in
makeup, automatically include within the district any tcrritory annexed to a member
city. CAL. PuR-. Uri. Coon, § 13911.
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legislature, usually accompanicd by referendums in the territory to be an-
llcxed. 17
CONCLUSION
The metropolitan special district has no exact governmental counter-
part and is, therefore, unique. Its uniqueness demands a legal and govern-
mental theory of its nature which takes into account its peculiar attributes.
This theory must be cohesive and far-sighted, so as not to impair the
development and future political utility of the metropolitan special district.
Moreover, this theory should be sufficiently flexible to transcend the variety
of minor differences between districts. It is submitted that no such theory
has been advanced by the courts and that those theories so far put forward
contain defects which might impede the future development of metro-
politan special districts.
It is unfortunate that the courts have drawn such broad analogies
between metropolitan districts and municipal corporations or between
metropolitan districts and state agencies. Actually, the metropolitan special
district falls in neither category, and theories which ignore its special
characteristics can lead to future legal and constitutional problems. When
courts, even with the best intentions, use a dubious theory, they avoid an
inimediate obstacle at the risk of creating more serious obstacles in the
future.
The best theory of the metropolitan special district is that which
recognizes it for what it is, a quasi-municipal corporation. Conceived of
in this light, its juridical status need not be unduly tortured to make it
conform to its governmental nature. While it is true that the metro-
politan special district is quite similar to the average municipal corporation
and may be so classified in the majority of cases, the courts must adopt
a theory which leaves them leeway to distinguish metropolitan special
districts from municipal corporations without at the same time resorting
to analogies which deny the substantial similarity of the two governmental
forms. It is submitted that the courts can most satisfactorily deal with
the metropolitan special district if they view it as a quasi-municipal cor-
poration.
179. ILL. STAT. A-N. ch. 42, §§ 373-380, z 18 (Smith-lhid 1934) for a list of
special annexation acts.
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